Goodness is the fulfillment of a genuine appetite—one that belongs to the nature of the thing. "The fundamental test of morality is whether an act is directed by reason to man’s ultimate end" or ultimate appetite. psychological tendency to associate the term “immoral” with harsh condemnation, judgementalism and even potential coercion. (82) Anything is immoral if there is a discrepancy between what ought to be done ideally towards a natural end, and what is being done. > The privation theory of evil holds that evil is an ontologically dependent reality. There is no evil without good, ontologically speaking. There is no pure evil or absolute evil, that is, no evil unmixed with some kind of good on which it supervenes, and unrelated to some kind of good in terms of which it must be understood. (85) To cause an evil, an agent has to remove a good. So they must, in some way and to some degree, acknowledge or recognise the good that they remove. (86) So an agent, I would argue, cannot orient themselves to evil per se – to evil in itself with no conceptualisation of the good whose privation it involves. (86) An immoral action will always be directed at something thought good – an apparent good. (89) privations do not have causal powers to produce anything, but we speak correctly of their causing things only inasmuch the positive states on which they supervene have the relevant causal powers and do the actual causing. (90) if a person can truly be said to intend evil, that can only be because they intend to produce some positive reality on which they know the evil supervenes...an agent cannot intend evil without intending some good. (90) So on what does the departure from the good that is moral evil supervene? It supervenes on the positive reality – the good – that the agent intends as an alternative to the good they should be causing. (91) What I mean by “direct” here is that one directly intends only what is one’s end or the means to one’s end. (91) The evil would, I claim, have to be a by-product, an indirect effect, of what the agent does actually intend directly, which is some good. (92)